Keycloak, default Dynamic Client Registration policy mis-validates the claim path for User Property mappers, letting a standard account with a limited Initial Access Token forge administrative roles and reach full realm control; CVSS 8.1, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1
cve · CVE-2026-16102
Coverage
1
first 2026-08-07 → last 2026-08-07
Latest activity
2026-08-07
Keycloak's identity broker stopped checking SAML signatures on a metadata-import edge case, one of seven CVEs…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, healthcare · regions: europe, switzerland
Sources cited
5
2 hosts
Action items (2)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-16102, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Upgrade Keycloak to 26.4.14, 26.6.5 or 26.7.1 (or the matching Red Hat Build of Keycloak release), then verify on each configured SAML identity provider that response signature validation is enabled; the flaw is that an import silently disabled it, so confirm the post-upgrade state on providers imported earlier rather than assuming the upgrade restored it.2026-08-07CVE-2026-16443 +6
- Review Dynamic Client Registration-created clients for protocol mappers that hardcode realm-admin or client-admin roles, and restrict Initial Access Token issuance to the registrations that need it.2026-08-07CVE-2026-16443 +6
Defender insights
What each entry about CVE-2026-16102 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 7 tactics)
6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Modify Authentication Process
- Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Defense ImpairmentModify Authentication Process
- Credential AccessModify Authentication Process · Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens
- ImpactEndpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1556Modify Authentication Process×1
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1556Modify Authentication Process×1
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1556Modify Authentication Process×1
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1606.002Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens×1
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1499.004Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation×1
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/keycloak-saml-broker-signature-bypass-cve-2026-16443 · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Keycloak, default Dynamic Client Registration policy mis-validates the claim path for User Property mappers, letting a standard account with a limited Initial Access Token forge administrative roles and reach full realm control; CVSS 8.1, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1 (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Keycloak×1
- Keycloak / Red Hat Build of Keycloak, SAML broker metadata import without key-usage attributes disables response signature validation, letting an unauthenticated attacker forge a SAML response and log in as any user whose external identifier is known; CVSS 7.4, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Keycloak, LDAP entry-DN user search escapes the configured users-DN boundary, disclosing and importing directory entries from outside the intended scope; CVSS 5.4, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Keycloak, user-event metrics record request-controlled error text as Prometheus labels, giving an authenticated user an unbounded-cardinality memory-exhaustion DoS; CVSS 6.5, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Keycloak; Authorization Services PathMatcher does not normalize URIs, so a trailing slash or matrix parameter selects a less restrictive policy and an authenticated user reaches restricted paths; CVSS 8.1, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Keycloak; Dynamic Client Registration 'Allowed Protocol Mapper Types' policy does not re-validate mapper type on update, allowing a type-swap to an admin-role-hardcoding mapper and full realm admin; CVSS 8.8, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Keycloak; SAML IdP-initiated SSO endpoint does not check the link-only restriction, so an attacker controlling a linked upstream identity gains full access to the local account; CVSS 7.4, fixed in 26.4.14 / 26.6.5 / 26.7.1×1
- Red Hat Build of Keycloak×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- access.redhat.com4 (80%)
- cert.ssi.gouv.fr1 (20%)
External references
All cited sources (5)
- access.redhat.comprimaryRed Hat Product Securityhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15572
- access.redhat.comprimaryRed Hat Product Securityhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16102
- access.redhat.comprimaryRed Hat Product Security, 2026-08-05https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16442
- access.redhat.comprimaryRed Hat Product Securityhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16443
- cert.ssi.gouv.frCERT-FR (ANSSI)https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/avis/CERTFR-2026-AVI-0976/