ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and added credentials in one
ConnectWise says it identified unauthorized access to application identities within its Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) environment; on 2026-10-17 it disabled seven application identities, suspended the service, says the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid, and warns that disabling does not reverse changes already made in a tenant (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management remain suspended with no confirmed restoration time, which also takes ConnectWise's SaaS Security monitoring and alerting out of service (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19); ConnectWise reports no successful threat activity in the environments it monitors since it implemented mitigations (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19) and says it cannot independently determine whether a given partner or customer tenant was affected (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Huntress and Todyl report that on 2026-10-15 the app's identity signed in to customer Microsoft 365 tenants from one hosting-provider address and received app-only Microsoft Graph tokens; the credential sits in the vendor's own tenant, so no user, MFA prompt or user Conditional Access was involved, and the app's consent covers read and write access to mail, files and Teams chats (Huntress, 2026-10-16; Todyl, 2026-10-15). Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants by 2026-10-16 and later counted almost 1,000 tenants with sign-in activity from that address, over 300 successful, after password spraying against four law-firm tenants on 13 and 14 October, and a separate failed wave targeted 16 tenants in policy and national-security sectors (Huntress, 2026-10-16). In about 50 of its tenants, ConnectWise Cloud Management apps assigned themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator; in one the Teams app added itself to Global Administrator and client secrets were added to an MSP management application and to Huntress's own application within about five minutes, the credential additions from private Azure space (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Microsoft Threat Intelligence, as BleepingComputer relays it, called it an active supply-chain attack and assessed likely abuse of existing permissions including Directory.ReadWrite.All (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17). How the credential was obtained, who is behind it and what was read remain unknown (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19; BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17).
Triage: the vendor's apps sign in from Azure addresses with a .NET SDK user agent, while the credential additions used a Python user agent; Python and curl are common in administration, so Huntress says the combination of actor, operation and user agent is the signal (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Role self-assignments carrying the vendor's own user agent are not proven benign, since Huntress has not confirmed vendor automation (Huntress, 2026-10-16).
We recently identified unauthorized access to application identities within the ConnectWise Cloud Backup environment.
Disabling the affected connections prevents new authentication through those connections; it does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant.
Whether a product vulnerability contributed has not been established
As of 19:00 UTC on October 16, Huntress has confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants.
The credential type was a client assertion, which means the credential lives in the vendor's own tenant.
These tenants are in the policy, national security, trade, and critical mineral sectors.
Because the application already held broad, previously granted permissions in each tenant, those sign-ins gave the attacker the technical ability to read and write mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats.
Revoking user sessions does not end this access.
Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated.
Disabling the app in a tenant stops new tokens from being issued there, though tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes.
Older tenants may list them under SkyKick names.
Since implementing mitigations, we have not observed successful threat activity in the environments we monitor.
ConnectWise's update of 2026-10-18 01:00 UTC took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline in addition to Cloud Backup, which had been suspended since 2026-10-17, so ConnectWise SaaS Security monitoring and alerting is out of service as well, and the update of 2026-10-19 01:15 UTC still gives no restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Disabling an app stops new tokens only: Todyl and SpecterOps each state that tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes, and ConnectWise says that after it revoked the Cloud Backup certificates previously issued tokens may remain usable until they expire (Todyl, 2026-10-15; SpecterOps, 2026-10-17; ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Todyl says to find every SkyKick and ConnectWise app in a tenant, inherited ones included, and that all SkyKick apps are published from one vendor tenant, and SpecterOps hunts for apps owned by that tenant, noting that older tenants may list them under SkyKick names (Todyl, 2026-10-15; SpecterOps, 2026-10-17).