SMS-blaster smishing in Switzerland: fake base stations push phones onto 2G and send spoofed texts past operator filters
BACS reported on 2025-09-09 that numerous fake parking-fine texts were reaching people in western Switzerland who had recently been in the places mentioned, and that one recipient's phone switched from 4G to 2G just before the message arrived, pointing to an SMS blaster (BACS, 2025-09-09). The device builds on IMSI-catcher technology: it poses as the best available mobile mast within a radius of 500 to 1,000 metres, forces connecting phones onto the outdated 2G standard and sends texts with forged sender information directly to the handset, bypassing the operator's SMS filters (BACS, 2025-09-09). In November 2025 Basel-Landschaft police arrested a suspect who had an SMS blaster in his car (SRF, 2025-11-13). On 2026-05-07 the awareness portal ebas.ch warned that the scam is establishing itself in Switzerland, with texts posing as authorities, banks or courier services that link to fake websites collecting credit card data or e-banking credentials and are adapted to the location, such as a parking fine where many cars are parked (ebas.ch, 2026-05-07).
One person who reported a case provided another valuable clue: shortly before receiving the text message, their smartphone switched from the 4G network to the older 2G standard.
The SMS blaster emits a strong signal that prompts all smartphones within a radius of 500 to 1,000 metres to connect to it.
This bypasses the operator’s SMS filters, leaving only the filters installed on the device itself (if any).
The suspect had an SMS blaster in his car. (translated from German)
As many smartphones keep on supporting 2G, even modern devices might potentially be affected.
This restriction can only be set by a device owner or a profile owner of an organization-owned managed profile on the parent profile.
The Swiss signal predates the ebas.ch post: BACS reported in September 2025 that fake parking-fine texts in western Switzerland were being sent with SMS blasters (BACS, 2025-09-09), and Basel-Landschaft police arrested a suspect with such a device in his car in November 2025 (SRF, 2025-11-13). Blocking 2G on managed Android devices uses the DISALLOW_CELLULAR_2G user restriction, available from API level 34 and settable only by a device owner or the owner of an organisation-owned managed profile (Android Developers). The observable BACS describes is the handset itself switching from 4G to 2G just before the scam text and back to 4G afterwards (BACS, 2025-09-09); no cited source documents mobile-management products surfacing that switch.